The House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina spared few punches in its report entitled Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 15, 2005). All levels of government received lots of criticism in this 379 tome (not including appendices).
We would have expected the charitable sector to take its share of the criticism given some of the press coverage of the Red Cross’ response to Hurricane Katrina. But...
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much to our surprise given that coverage, the charitable sector comes off looking pretty darn good.
Here are some interesting facts. Everybody assumed it was the case, but the Report puts it out front: The response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest disaster response in U.S. history. Although the Federal government will provide the overwhelming share of the funding, the charitable sector raised $3.13 billion in private donations. The Red Cross led that effort, putting together an impressive $2 billion package (some of it presumably representing government funding). Other charities stepped up to the plate, with Catholic Charities raising $137 million, United Way raising $45 million, and the Salvation Army raising an unspecified amount that permitted it to continue using its expertise in disaster relief.
Much of the portion of the Report devoted to the response by charities focuses on the Red Cross’ efforts, with the report summarizing the response as follows:
As much as any organization, public or private, the Red Cross played a substantial role in the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina. In what became a $2 billion, 220,000-person enterprise, the relief efforts undertaken by the Red Cross include the provision of financial assistance to 1.2 million families, encompassing more than 3.7 million hurricane survivors. As of January 9, 2006, the Red Cross reported that since Katrina made landfall, it had provided hurricane survivors with nearly 3.42 million overnight stays in nearly 1,100 shelters across 27 states and the District of Columbia. In coordination with the Southern Baptist Convention, the Red Cross has served more than 52 million meals or snacks to hurricane survivors. The Katrina response is larger — 20 times so — than any other Red Cross mission in its 125-year history.
The Report then breaks down the Red Cross’ response between the pre-landfall actions and the post landfall actions. Key aspects of the pre-landfall response included:
■ Chapters across the region are opening shelters in support of evacuations in all states.
■ 275,000 HeaterMeals staged in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
■ 225,000 HeaterMeals staged in Montgomery, Alabama.
■ 15 sites being identified to bring in big kitchens with support of Southern Baptists to provide 300,000 meals per day feeding capability.
■ All 14 Disaster Field Supply Center warehouses loading supplies including 50,000 cots, 100,000 blankets, comfort and clean-up kits.
■ All vehicles in the Red Cross fleet across the country are on alert for possible deployment and are being dispatched to staging areas.
■ All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles (ECRVs) deployed to staging areas.
■ Red Cross staff deployed to NRCC, Region VI RRCC, Region IV RRCC, ERT-As and other ESF #6 posts
The Report then goes onto to describe post-landfall actions, stating:
As Katrina made landfall on August 29, the Red Cross was fully staffing all of the relevant state and federal Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), including Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions IV and VI’s Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), as well as Emergency Response Advance Element Teams (ERT-A) teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.19 Sites for 25 kitchens for a total daily capacity of 500,000 people were identified and pre-staged.20 The Red Cross was also aware of the increasing population at the Superdome, a shelter of last resort it did not support.
One of the more telling comments in the Report describes the Red Cross’ regional facility that was used to coordinate the Red Cross response. The Report states:
The ability of the Red Cross to rapidly open and operate such a sophisticated facility in a short amount time reflects the sophisticated planning regime the Red Cross has long had in place. The rapid standing up of the facility was described by Laura Howe a Birmingham-based Red Cross official as the equivalent of opening a Fortune 500 company in a couple days time.
We have heard a lot about the failure of the overall response to the flooding in New Orleans; that response probably best summarized as too little, too late. Ah, but look what the Report has to say about the Red Cross’ response to the flooding:
The flooding of New Orleans became a reality on August 30 and the Mayor declared that “80 percent of the city is under water and media sources report the water level is still rising, due in part to broken levees and failed water pumps in the city.”34 By 8:00 a.m. on August 30, the Red Cross was operating 254 shelters for 41,013 people and serving more than 63,000 meals a day. According to the Red Cross’ periodic reporting documentation, these numbers continued to grow. The largest number of meals served in a day occurred on September 4, when nearly 946,000 meals were provided.
The Report then serves up what might be viewed as some criticism, stating:
That being said, the unprecedented devastation of Katrina, both in terms of property damage and number of individuals affected, was much larger than the Red Cross was equipped to handle. Its logistics system was not sophisticated enough – especially with egard to food service. Many problems were experienced in obtaining enough food to satisfy client needs. Many of the food orders processed through FEMA were either inexplicably canceled or never satisfied. On follow-up, it was discovered that many of the orders placed by the Red Cross with FEMA were not reflected in FEMA’s systems. FEMA’s logistics system was not sophisticated enough to handle the volume Katrina triggered.
But you have to ask: Should there be criticism, or just recognition that this disaster was so large that no amount of planning could have avoided problems? As we have said before, we as a society have come to believe that every problem can be solved immediately and that nobody dies. It ain’t so. Moreover, the Report goes onto to indicate that the communication, logistics, and coordination lapses had their origins with FEMA, with whom the Red Cross was required to work.
And we heard about inadequate response by the Red Cross from local political leaders. Yet, the Report shifts the blame to the local government units, stating:
The Red Cross has been criticized in both Mississippi and Louisiana for a variety of reasons, from excessive levels of bureaucracy to lack of sufficient shelters and food. Becker said the root cause of many problems centered on substantial incongruities between the state and local political leadership on one hand and state emergency management personnel on the other. Far too often state emergency management personnel and local political leadership were not aligned. The Red Cross would receive one set of directions from the state and another from the locals. Becker said, however, with independently elected sheriffs, mayors, and county and parish commissioners, this is not an easily avoidable problem. Many complaints lodged at the Red Cross reflected their policy of not operating shelters in danger zones. Local political leadership often feels compelled to open shelters in their locales even when the entire county or parish is subject to a mandatory evacuation order. The Red Cross has trouble servicing these shelters, both from an access perspective (the roads are sometimes inaccessible) and from an identification perspective (sometimes nobody tells the Red Cross where the shelters are).
At this point, the Report does offer some criticism of the Red Cross. It focuses on “well intentioned” Red Cross volunteers who were involved in distributing financial assistance.
On numerous instances, the ARC volunteers would simply find a vacant parking area and commence voucher distribution operations. Immediately, crowds would gather and would overwhelm the distribution site. The ARC would then call on the Guard for assistance. Repeated attempts were made to reinforce the need for prior coordination for site security. It was not until mid-September that the ARC started coordinating these operations. Also, the ARC had volunteers who attempted to coordinate directly with subordinate Guard units for shelter and distribution site security.
Yet, the Report continues:
Far too many shelters were unknown to the Red Cross, making it difficult for it to deploy resources. Many of these shelters were within the danger or surge zones, including the Superdome. The Red Cross does not service these “shelters of last resort,” as it would put its volunteers in harm’s way. After Katrina passed, the Red Cross did attempt to deliver provisions to the Superdome, but was denied access. “The Homeland Security Department has requested and continues to request that the American Red Cross not come back into New Orleans. Right now accessis controlled by he National Guard and local authorities. . . . We cannot get into New Orleans against their orders,” Renita Hosler, a Red Cross spokesperson, told The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
The Red Cross encountered many access problems where local law enforcement would not permit entry to establish a shelter. The Select Committee asked the Red Cross for an accounting of the shelters utilized as compared to the pre-approved shelter list, and for the reasons behind any differences. The Red Cross provided the Select Committee with a complete list of every shelter in operation between the dates of August 25 and September 30, but will not provide a specific listing explaining why certain pre-approved shelters were not used. Lori Polacheck, of the Red Cross general counsel’s office said this was too difficult an undertaking.
At this point, the Report goes onto to offer explicit criticism of the Red Cross. It provides anecdotal evidence regarding several shelters that failed to function properly. It also notes that Red Cross’s president resigned in December among growing criticism of the Red Cross. The problem with this section of the Report is that it is based on earlier congressional hearings, as well as evidence supplied by congresspeople in the affected areas. While no doubt there were failures, the bulk of the Report suggests that the Red Cross response was quite good. Moreover, it concludes that where there were deficiencies, FEMA and local government officials were often the cause of those deficiencies.
But probably the most realistic assessment comes toward the end of the discussion, when the Report states:
This $2 billion operation must be contrasted with the Red Cross’ overall financial model. According to its 2004 Annual Report, its operating revenues were just over $3 billion. In 2004, its stated operating expenses for domestic disaster services was $261 million. It is unrealistic to expect any charitable relief organization to instantaneously pivot in response to the might inflicted by Katrina. As Katrina was too large for the emergency management professionals in the state of Louisiana, the city of New Orleans, and FEMA, it was as well for the Red Cross.
The Red Cross readily agrees it did not have a presence everywhere throughout the affected region. The primary mission of the Red Cross is to provide food, clothing, and shelter to victims of disasters. Given its size, there are misconceptions about its capabilities. The Red Cross does not provide transportation, does not get involved with search and rescue operations, does not participate in evacuations, and does not provide medical care (other than providing assistance with minor medical issues).
The Report concludes:
With its $2 billion relief effort, the Red Cross has been able to fulfill many of its obligations under the National Response Plan. Katrina, however, overwhelmed the Red Cross. The Red Cross, like FEMA, did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast victims. Among other challenges, the Red Cross was required to grapple with the sometimes disorganized manner in which shelters were established. While it has a well-defined role in operating shelters, many of the local governments set up ad hoc shelters without notifying Red Cross officials. In some cases, the Red Cross was denied access to shelters. Despite falling short of being universally present everywhere there was a need, the Red Cross and numerous other charitable organizations performed admirably and heroically in reaching the greatest number of people with impressive speed.
BOTTOMLINE: The Red Cross should take the intiative to work with FEMA and local officials before disasters strikes. This means building networks, prepositioning supplies, and developing contingency plans. Certainly any disaster relief operation can be improved and the Red Cross should work toward continuous improvement. The Red Cross also needs to refocus its public relations and media campaigns. The public and its leaders simply don't understand the Red Cross' role in disasters or the limitations that are imposed on it.
What is clear is that there was not a disaster at the nation's leading disaster relief agency. Those in government were quick to criticize the Red Cross. They were too willing to point their shotguns in the air and pepper anyone within firing range. What they were really doing was trying to deflect the public's attention from their own incompetence. Our friends in Washington, D.C. and at the state and local levels should cut the partisian crap and begin to govern.
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